CULTURAL, ETHNIC, AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN

Bentuhua

EDITED BY JOHN MAKEHAM AND A-CHIN HSIAU

"*Cultural, Ethnic and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan* offers timely discussions on important changes in today's Taiwan. Having situated Taiwan in a global context and characterized the *bentuhua* as a nationalist endeavor, the contributors of this volume examine carefully the island's colonial legacy, post-colonial experience and ongoing confrontation with mainland China. Their studies provide not only valuable and up-to-date information on Taiwan but also interesting and insightful perspectives on the persistent influence of nationalism and colonialism in this postcolonial and globalizing world."

—Q. Edward Wang, Rowan University

"This book provides its readers with an assessment of the cultural and ethnic variables that help answer the question whether or not Taiwan should and / or will become part of China. This is a very critical question: The 'Taiwan issue' constitutes a seemingly non-negotiable matter between the world's sole superpower, the United States, and the region's fast rising power, China. The result is that the Taiwan Strait is the world's number one 'flashpoint' (or place where a conflict might occur with major powers employing weapons of mass destruction). Starting with the basics may be the key to finding a solution to prevent that."

—John F. Copper, Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies, Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee

"The first volume in any language to address comprehensively the theme of indigenization in Taiwan, Makeham and Hsiau's work probes the various meanings of *bentuhua* from an array of interdisciplinary perspectives. This is a set of nuanced, historically-informed readings that treats an incendiary topic with temperance and sophistication."

—Christopher Lupke, Assistant Professor of Chinese, Washington State University

ISBN 1-4039-7020-3

9 781403 970206

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The essays in this volume analyze what is arguably the single most important aspect of cultural and political change in Taiwan over the past quarter-century: the trend toward "indigenization" (*bentuhua*). Focusing on the indigenization of politics and culture and its close connection with the identity politics of ethnicity and nationalism, *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan* is an attempt to map prominent contours of the indigenization paradigm as it has unfolded in Taiwan. The opening chapters concern the origin and nature of the trend toward indigenization with its roots in the unique historical trajectory of politics and culture in Taiwan. Subsequent chapters deal with responses and reactions to indigenization in a variety of social, cultural, and intellectual domains.

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First published in 2005 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS
Companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 1–4039–7020–3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cultural, ethnic, and political nationalism in contemporary Taiwan : bentuhua / edited by John Makeham and A-chin Hsiau.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1–4039–7020–3
1. Nationalism—Taiwan. 2. Ethnicity—Taiwan. 3. Democratization—Taiwan. 4. Taiwan—Politics and government. I. Makeham, John, 1955– II. Hsiau, A-chin.

DS799.847.C85 2005
320.54'095124'9—dc22 2005040471

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: August 2005

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America.

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A-chin Hsiau

In Taiwan's closely fought presidential election held in March 2004, incumbent President Chen Shuibian 陳水扁 and his running-mate Lü Xiulian (Annette Lu) 呂秀蓮 of the Democratic Progressive Party defeated their rivals, Chinese Nationalist Party Chairman Lian Zhan 連戰 and his vice presidential candidate People First Party (*Qinmin dang* 親民黨) Chairman Song Chuyu (James Soong) 宋楚瑜. This result represents a further consolidation of the indigenization of Taiwan's politics. As many commentators have stated, the reelection of President Chen confirmed the continued ascendancy of Taiwan-centered consciousness,[1] or the Taiwanese people's sense of national identity, and this will lead to Taiwan's moving further away from China. As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this book is to make a timely contribution to analyzing what is arguably the single most important aspect of cultural and political change in Taiwan over the past quarter-century: the trend toward indigenization. This epilogue discusses in more detail several issues raised in individual chapters. These issues include the significance of Taiwan's unique historical trajectory as a driving force for indigenization; the relationship between globalization and the trend toward indigenization; the reactions and discontent caused by this trend; and the future of indigenization.

The Driving Force for Indigenization and Taiwan's Unique Historical Trajectory

Viewed retrospectively, the main force driving the indigenization of Taiwan's politics has been the internal dynamics of ethnic (*zuqun*)

relations, especially the uneven distribution of political and cultural power between "mainlanders" (*waishengren*) and local Taiwanese (*benshengren*) that characterized postwar Taiwanese society. Dramatic political and cultural change, however, did not begin to occur until the 1970s. In the wake of rapid economic development, by the end of the 1960s Taiwan encountered problems of rural deterioration, labor disputes, and uneven distribution of wealth. The next decade began with major diplomatic setbacks that crippled the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD)-controlled government. These changes forced the GMD to initiate limited political reform when President Jiang Jieshi handed over the power to his son Jiang Jingguo. The indigenization trend started with these rapid socioeconomic and dramatic political changes and gained increasing momentum over the following quarter-century.

The early 1970s witnessed a political response by the postwar generation to the country's diplomatic failures, authoritarian rule, and economic inequalities. Throughout the 1970s *dangwai* dissidents led by Huang Xinjie 黃信介 and Kang Ningxiang 康寧祥 played the key role in this postwar generation's response, calling for sociopolitical reforms based on a realistic recognition that the Republic of China (*Zhonghua minguo* 中華民國) did not control the Chinese mainland but only Taiwan. Key to this demand was the proposition that Taiwan should establish a true democracy and adopt entirely new measures to secure international recognition as a sovereign state. Since then, indigenization in the political domain has demanded that *benshengren* be granted full civil rights and equal political rights with those afforded to the *waishengren* elite; that the *benshengren* political elite gain more power through democratic elections; and that Taiwan should seek independent national identity through domestic negotiation and international recognition.

The cultural elite of the postwar generation in 1970s Taiwan devoted itself to promoting *Xiangtu* (Nativist) Literature 鄉土文學 as a genre responsive to local sociocultural realities and to discovering Taiwanese literature written under Japanese colonialism.[2] Similarly, *dangwai* dissidents drew on the history of Taiwanese resistance to Japanese colonialism to facilitate political mobilization.[3] A unique form of Taiwanese collective memory and identity fed on this cultural and historical construction, paving the way for the post-1980s Taiwanese nationalistic historical narrative. Since the 1970s, in the cultural domain, the general idea that the uniqueness of Taiwanese society/culture/history must be appreciated and interpreted from

the viewpoint of the Taiwanese people per se has been increasingly adopted as a paradigmatic principle for knowledge construction and cultural representation. The development of this cultural trend was subsequently incorporated into the political pursuit of an independent national identity.

Over the past two centuries, conceptions of nationalism and the nation-state have constituted a dominant ideology adopted by political communities throughout the world. Since the latter half of the twentieth century many theorists have argued that these ideologies have been unable to withstand postmodernist challenges to various meta-discourses (among which nationalism is regarded as a prominent example); the development of deconstructionist approaches to culture and identity; and the formidable process of globalization.[4] In different parts of the world, however, many people are still committed to establishing distinct national identities and nation-states even though their respective efforts involve different historical dynamics and secure differing degrees of domestic and international support.

Situated in the postmodern context, Taiwanese nationalism is an historical "latecomer" when viewed from the perspective of the global spread of nationalism.[5] In order to understand the forces motivating latecomers to join the nationalist club, one has to grasp the particularities of their respective historical trajectories. Focusing on the indigenization of politics and culture and its close connection with the identity politics of ethnicity and nationalism, this volume has sought to map prominent contours of the indigenization paradigm as it has unfolded over the past quarter-century in Taiwan. In its early phase, the principal driving force behind the indigenization of Taiwan's politics and culture was the internal dynamics of ethnic inequality between *waishengren* and *benshengren*. Since the 1990s, however, the call for indigenization has been closely connected to the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the international arena. Thus, indigenization has become increasingly involved in resisting the escalating challenge of the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.

Globalization and the Trend toward Indigenization

At a time when the issue of globalization arouses considerable attention and debate, it may be asked: Is Taiwan's trend toward indigenization, especially in the cultural sphere, an expression of "localization" in

reaction to globalization? Globalization may be characterized as a set of mutually reinforcing transformations that have occurred over the last decades of the twentieth century. Such transformations include changing concepts of space and time, an increasing volume of cultural interactions, a common stock of problems facing the world's inhabitants, growing interconnections and interdependencies, as well as a network of increasingly powerful transnational actors and organizations.[6] Thus understood, globalization bears only a remote relationship to the sort of political and cultural indigenization that has occurred in Taiwan since the 1970s. By and large, these changes have gained momentum primarily through the internal historical reality of politics and culture, rather than as a reaction to globalization. As Maukuei Chang explains in his chapter, the one partial exception to this is in the social sciences, where the term indigenization has been employed as a reaction to "Westernization."

This is not to say that globalization had no influence on the indigenization trend discussed in this book, although that influence has not been our primary focus. Indeed, it is not difficult to find evidence of the impact of globalization (especially global capitalism) on the "by-products" of political and cultural indigenization, even though this may be regarded as a superficial observation of the most obvious effects of globalization. For example, Taiwan has felt pressure to establish its own political and cultural identity vis-à-vis China because of increasing international exchanges and cultural interactions. In order to attract international tourists, Taiwan has had to think about what its unique cultural legacy is. According to the directors of two leading travel agencies in Taiwan, "there are attractions in Taiwan, but these need to be marketed better and the concept of a distinct identity from China had to be made." They mention that they have been trying to promote "the concept of small and beautiful, compared with the big mountains and water attractions of China."[7] The government recently allocated NT $200 million (about US $6 million) to promote "2004: Visit Taiwan Year."[8] Promotional events held overseas and advertisements placed in major international media (e.g., CNN, National Geographic Channel, Knowledge Channel, *Time* magazine, and so on) emphasized aboriginal dancing, the Mazu Pilgrimage (*Mazu jinxiang* 媽祖進香), the Yanshui rocket festival (*Yanshui fengpao* 鹽水蜂炮), Taiwanese ghost festivals (*qi yue guijie* 七月鬼節), the Eight Generals (*ba jia jiang* 八家將), glove puppet performances, Tainan noodles, pearl milk-tea (*zhenzhu naicha* 珍珠奶茶), and the like, in addition to the Taipei 101 building and the Taroko Gorge.[9]

As John Tomlinson argues, globalization should not be supposed simply to bring about cultural homogenization. The general effects of the trend toward the compression of the world into a single place is not a simplistic uniformity, but "a *context* which increasingly determines social relations" and simultaneously "a *frame of reference* within which social agents increasingly figure their existence, identities and actions."[10] Nevertheless, the act of highlighting those local cultural resources within the reference frame of global tourism is a made possible by political and cultural indigenization. It is hardly imaginable that aboriginal dancing, Taiwanese ghost festivals, glove puppet performances, Tainan noodles, pearl milk-tea, and so on would be presented as the symbols of the Republic of China (ROC) and promoted internationally, if Taiwanese language, culture, and history remained marginalized and repressed in a public sphere dominated by Chinese nationalism. Moreover, it is arguable that Taiwan is a counter-example to the claim that nationalism and nation-states are losing their significance due to the impact of globalization. In a sense, the case of Taiwan shows that globalization can fuel aspirations for national identity and nation-state identity instead of dwarfing them.[11] Viewed retrospectively, however, it is the particular internal dynamics of ethnic relations and the ongoing confrontation across the Taiwan Strait that have formed the essential driving force for the pursuit of indigenization.

Responses to Indigenization

The first two chapters (chapter 1 and chapter 2), by J. Bruce Jacobs and Fu-chang Wang, analyzed the political and sociocultural contexts in which the trend toward indigenization emerged, the nature of GMD rule, the development of the Taiwanese opposition movement, and the relationship of these issues to the identity politics of ethnicity and nationalism. This examination of the sources of the trend toward indigenization also provided a background for discussions in the later chapters. The part of Wang's chapter (chapter 2) that deals with the 1997 textbook controversy and Rosemary Haddon's chapter (chapter 3) on Zhu Tianxin's novel *Gudu* (Ancient Capital; 1997) examined reactions to, and discontent about, the trend toward indigenization expressed primarily by *waishengren*. These studies reveal the anxiety and alienation experienced by many *waishengren* as the indigenization trend threatened to marginalize their own political position, cultural symbolism, and collective memories. The chapters by A-chin Hsiau,

Jeremy Taylor, John Makeham, and Maukeui Chang (chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 respectively) examined how the idea of indigenization has impacted on various fields of knowledge construction and cultural representation. In the areas of literature, preservation and restoration of the built environment, Confucian revivalism, and sociology, the indigenization idea has been variously manifested, creating different effects and problems within these areas.

Although this volume focuses on the unique historical dynamics of politics and culture in Taiwan, its findings also contribute to understanding more general issues. For example, the problems encountered in the trend toward indigenization in Taiwan are typical of those encountered by other "postcolonial" societies when those societies attempt to rediscover and reconstruct their political and cultural identity. It should be noted that colonialism is not necessarily imposed from outside a country or a people but can also be replicated and imposed from within.[12] In many formally decolonialized societies, inequalities cannot be easily eradicated due to deep-seated divisions based on class, ethnicity, gender, region, and so on. Therefore, it has been argued, "it is more helpful to think of post-colonialism not just as coming literally after colonialism and signifying its demise, but more flexibly as the contestation of colonial domination and the legacies of colonialism."[13] As J. Jorge Klor de Alva proposes, postcoloniality should denote "not so much subjectivity 'after' the colonial experience as a subjectivity of oppositionality to imperializing/colonizing (read: subordinating/subjectivizing) discourse and practices."[14] As a result of GMD rule, new political and cultural inequalities were established in prewar Taiwan in the wake of the collapse of Japanese colonialism. The institutionalization of the *benshengren–waishengren* ethnic distinction (created by the GMD) promoted and protected political and cultural inequalities. Postcoloniality in Taiwan consists in challenging those imperializing/colonizing discourses and practices based on the ROC system—and more recently, the PRC system—and in attempting to establish a form of subjectivity for a would-be nation.

The reactions and discontent that were engendered when the process of political and cultural indigenization in Taiwan became sufficiently developed in the 1990s (and discussed in chapters 2 and 3 by Wang and Haddon) resemble the major integrative problem experienced by those new states that won independence from colonialism after World War II: the conflict between primordial sentiments and

civil order. As Clifford Geertz insightfully points out, the very process of political modernization in these new countries—the formation of a sovereign civil state and the imposition of a modern political consciousness upon the population—tends not to soften primordial sentiments. Rather, it stimulates people's obsessive concern with their primordial connections such as assumed blood, race, language, region, religion, custom, and the like, and thus results in a common problem: the "political normalization of primordial discontent."[15] Geertz also characterizes this problem as a clash between two opposed motives: "the desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions 'matter,' and the desire to build an efficient, dynamic modern state."[16] Of course, the historical process of pursuing an independent national identity in which the trend toward indigenization is integral, differs from the process experienced by those newly emergent states more than half a century ago. In addition, the historical dynamics that brought about the creation of categories of identification in Taiwan—widely assumed to be primordial—are unique. Nevertheless, the source of the problems that the trend toward indigenization engendered is similar to a problem experienced by the states that emerged in the postwar period, that is, a form of "longing not to belong to any other group" that undermines civil sentiments.[17] As the reactions and discontent brought about by the trend toward indigenization evidence, the difficulties presented by "integrative revolution" in Taiwan are no less complex than those experienced by the states that emerged in the postwar period.

Reactions and discontent caused by the accelerating process of political and cultural indigenization in Taiwan have also been expressed in China. Before the 1990s, the attacks made by the PRC against the indigenization process (including the development of Taiwanese nationalism) were limited to "political" (in the narrow sense of the word) figures, activities, and affairs. It was not until the late 1990s that the PRC began to pay attention to indigenized knowledge construction and cultural representation in Taiwan, especially when these activities were used to support the claim that Taiwan has a distinct national identity.[18] Since then the PRC has grown increasingly critical of the way in which the period of Japanese colonization has been portrayed in the indigenization process (Wang's, Hsiau's, and Taylor's chapters each examined different dimensions of this portrayal). In fact, more than three decades ago, in his pioneering study on Taiwanese nationalism, Douglas Mendel dealt with the fact that

just several years after the GMD controlled the island, the Taiwanese began to cherish the colonial past. He points out that,

> [I]f however [Japanese] "influence" is defined as Japanese education of the Formosans [Taiwanese] in efficient government, honest police, and orderly economic development, the charge is valid. Educated Formosans who compared the rule of the prewar Japanese "dogs" with the postwar Chinese "pigs" found the latter definitely inferior. Fifty years of Japanese influence in Formosa [Taiwan] did not make the natives pro-Japanese, but they did provide a standard to which the postwar Chinese Nationalists failed to measure up.[19]

After the February 28 Incident of 1947, memories—if not all positive and pleasant—of Japanese colonialism were one of the chief elements that contributed to the formation and maintenance of a particular Taiwanese identity. This is especially true of members of the generations who had lived under the Japanese. Under the GMD, for a long time the colonial experience of the Taiwanese people was stigmatized and forbidden from public discussion. However, after the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979, Taiwanese nationalists, especially those humanist intellectuals in the fields of literature, history, and language movements, began openly to destigmatize the colonial experience of the Taiwanese people and to construct a positive historical memory of the colonial period with a view to discrediting the GMD rule. It has not been unusual for the period of Japanese colonial rule to have attracted undisguised—if limited—admiration. That is, colonial history becomes "more of an asset than a liability."[20] When the remarkable development of political and cultural indigenization ensured, those who are nostalgic about the Japanese colonial legacy are not limited to the "colonial" or prewar generations. Over the past two decades, as members of the prewar generations have passed away, growing numbers of the postwar generations have been variously mobilized to join the uncoordinated project of reconstructing a collective memory of the Taiwanese past, in which the Japanese colonial period forms the main part. The unexpected increasing interest in, and reconstruction of, colonial history by the younger generations bear witness to the consolidation of the indigenization of the Taiwanese national imagination, though at first glance, the kind of interest and reconstruction may appear to have little relationship to the idea of Taiwanese political independence.

Taiwanese nostalgia for the colonial period can be contrasted with popular anti-Japanese resentment in China during the postwar period.

From the disputes about the description of Japan's military invasion of China in the twentieth century in Japanese school textbooks to the popular anger caused by Japan's soccer team beating China in the Asian Cup Final in August of 2004, show that anti-Japanese sentiment in China, as Edward Friedman describes it, has been "popular, spontaneous, and rooted in history."[21] It seems that this anti-Japanese sentiment has not attenuated as a result of the normalized relations between China and Japan in 1972. Even though the economic relations and cultural exchange between Japan and China have been improving, a Chinese scholar recently expressed his worry that in spite of the close relationship, the images of each country in the other country seem to have been increasingly unfavorable. "The problem in the relationship between the two countries is like an active volcano that often erupts."[22]

Situated in this context of ongoing popular anti-Japanese feeling, the PRC's attacks on the nostalgic reinterpretation of the Japanese colonial past are not surprising. Since the late 1990s, when the PRC began to pay attention to indigenized knowledge construction and cultural representation in Taiwan, there have been few official attacks in China on the positive reinterpretation of the period of Japan's colonial rule there. Nevertheless, harsh criticisms by PRC scholars have been increasing. For these critics, those Taiwanese who claim a particular Taiwanese national identity embrace a sort of "Japanophilia." They argue that almost all Taiwanese political leaders, including Li Denghui, who challenge the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and pursue the goal of statehood for the island, have an abnormal "Japanophilic complex" (*qin Ri qingjie* 親日情結).[23] They emphasize that, under colonial rule, in general the Taiwanese people were "anti-Japanese" (*kang Ri de* 抗日的). They strongly condemn the way a reconstructed collective memory of Japanese colonialism has dominated the indigenization process, maintaining that it praises Japanese imperialism and promotes anti-Chinese separatism.[24] Obviously, the purpose of such an act of stigmatizing this reconstructed collective memory is to de-legitimate the claim that a particular Taiwanese national identity deserves an independent state.

Moreover, situated in the context of international politics, Taiwan's colonial past and the development of Taiwanese nationalism have played a definite role in the postwar relationship between China and Japan. It is rather common for Chinese scholars and political writers to regard Taiwan as Japan's (and also the United States') tool for carrying forward her long-standing scheme of "using the Chinese to

counteract the Chinese" (以華制華). Japan has been seen as a key base for overseas Taiwanese nationalists, especially after the rise of the political right in 1980s Japanese domestic politics. A Chinese scholar thus writes: "The Taiwan issue has become the most provocative and complex problem involved in the China-Japan relationship"; "As far as the Taiwan issue is concerned, although the USA is a troublemaker, in reality it is Japan that is the villain."[25]

Collective Memory and Intellectuals

Taiwan's trend toward indigenization has brought to the surface such complex issues such as postcoloniality, ethnicity, citizenship, and national identity because indigenization challenges a collective memory of an old Chinese polity that maintained time-honored cultural and linguistic traditions. The troubles are compounded by the fact that the geographic dimension of this collective memory sustains the perception of a close relationship with a rising power hostile to Taiwan, the PRC. As a consequence, the tensions caused by domestic ethnic divisions—which presumably could be relaxed through patient negotiations within the framework of a sovereign country—have become enmeshed in the complex international confrontation across the Taiwan Strait (this view is expressed by Wang in chapter 2).

This kind of lingering collective memory constitutes another project of indigenization. This project is different from that which aims to establish a distinct Taiwanese national identity, having emerged earlier and coexisted with it despite the development of Taiwanese nationalism. John Makeham's chapter on a group of Confucian revivalists and Maukeui Chang's chapter on sociology address a version of indigenization based on a "China-centered" collective memory. The Confucian revivalists' notion of indigenization—in which they attempt to reconcile the notion of Taiwanese cultural identity with the claim that "Taiwanese culture" is a part of "Chinese culture"—is a response to the trend toward "Taiwan-centered" indigenization. The dynamics of the project of indigenization in the social sciences is, however, very different. The indigenization project championed by social scientists since the 1970s continues to concern itself with the notion of a modern Chinese nation that prevailed among intellectuals in late imperial and early Republican China. They also reproduce the "meta-anxiety" widely shared by intellectuals of that time about foreign (especially Western) domination. This meta-anxiety led them to dwell

on possible strategies to achieve China's revival, prevalent amongst which was the idea that traditional Chinese culture should somehow be integrated with Western modernity. This idea has obviously been accepted by those who pursue the indigenization of the social sciences in Taiwan. Situated in this context, the movement in Taiwan over the last two decades to "Sinicize" or "indigenize" the social sciences constitutes one of the cultural reactions developed by intellectuals in the third world in response to the impact of Western modernity over the past century. A similar meta-anxiety and related actions can be found among intellectuals in other areas impacted by the rising West, such as Iran and Africa.[26] Such responses, in different areas of the world, bear witnesses to the important role played by intellectuals in the articulation of nationalism and nation-building. This is also evident in the process of "Taiwan-centered" indigenization (Hsiau and Taylor touch on this aspect in chapters 4 and 5).

The Future of the Trend toward Indigenization: A "Latecomer" Coming too Late?

What is the future of the trend toward political and cultural indigenization in Taiwan? Three factors among many are vital. The first is ethnic politics: Can ethnic politics in Taiwan sever its connection with the complicating factor of nationalistic politics? The pursuit of equal ethnic rights in political and cultural activities needs to be conducted in a climate free of the tensions caused by debates about an alternative politically imagined community, such as the PRC. Only then will it increasingly be recognized that ethnic equality is fundamentally a domestic issue that calls for patient internal negotiations within the framework of a single sovereignty. Second, the future of the trend toward political and cultural indigenization also depends on whether it can move toward a more "civic nationalism." The "integrative revolution" that Geertz referred to in discussing the experience of the newly independent states after World War II has only just begun in Taiwan. Ideally, the indigenization trend will promote the development of a "normal" country espousing an inclusive citizenship based on civic nationalism. Taiwan is not, however, a normal country at all. Its national sovereignty is recognized by only a few other countries and too often its domestic political conflicts become enmeshed with a concept of cultural tradition and a form of historical memory that is

being increasingly appropriated by the PRC. Modern concepts of citizenship are premised on the concept of sovereignty. As far as the issue of national identity is concerned, Taiwan lacks the framework that would enable its citizens to reconcile themselves to one another as members of a "community of fate." The essential condition for establishing a more "civil" society—in which internal issues such as ethnic equality can be patiently addressed—is lacking. This is a major problem that Taiwan has encountered in the past and remains a key impediment if the process of indigenization in politics and culture is to continue.

It follows that the third factor affecting the future of the indigenization trend is the attitude that the PRC and other powers adopt in regard to Taiwanese nationalism. The grim reality of international politics constitutes a strong factor determining whether the project of indigenization can achieve its ultimate goal: Taiwan's becoming a "normal" country. Therefore, the core issue facing the indigenization project is not whether it can overcome the potential parochialism of nationalism or survive the challenge of globalization but whether it can create a "normal" political community that functions as a framework within which people of different ethnic identities, political positions, and "nation-views" can recognize the importance of peaceful coexistence and patient negotiation, when local life is still "the vast order of human social existence which continues, because of the constraints of physical embodiment, to dominate even in a globalized world."[27] Although the trend toward indigenization has caused discontent and faced challenges, it represents the ideal of emphasizing the importance of thinking and practicing "*actually within localities*"—to borrow John Tomlinson's term[28]—and of establishing national political institutions that are informed by such a form of thinking and practicing. Only peace—both domestic and in cross–Strait relations—can make it possible for people to develop their own identities freely and learn to respect the identities of others.

The three factors affecting the future of the indigenization process constitute the knotty problems that have been encountered as indigenization has developed. These problems derive in part from the fact that Taiwanese nationalism is a historical latecomer in terms of the global spread of nationalism. A latecomer who strives for statehood at the turn of the twenty-first century has to meet the challenges of growing antiessentialist and deconstructionist discourse on collective identity and of the calls for the end of the nation-state, regional integration, and globalization. Collectively, these popular discourses share an

underlying view that may be put in this way—the nationalist club is not worth joining because the game they play is no fun at all. For Taiwanese nationalists who seek to establish Taiwan's distinct national identity via cultural and political indigenization, however, the kernel of the issue is that the island country has been excluded from playing the game, rather than that the club or the game is no fun and not worth joining. Obviously, China is the single power that has tried everything to maintain Taiwan's exclusion from the world community. Struggling forward within the long-established global framework of nation-states and with the fact that Chinese nationhood has been consolidated over the past century, as a historical latecomer to the nationalist club, Taiwan has to struggle to demonstrate her particularity so as to legitimate the claim of political independence. The latent or obvious ironies involved in the process of cultural and political indigenization (Haddon, Hsiau, and Taylor discuss some of these ironies in chapters 3, 4, and 5), which its critics have been eager to point out, derive partially from the belatedness and postmodernity of Taiwanese nationalism. If Japanese colonialism formed the first denial of Taiwanese national identity and the GMD rule the second, the task of meeting the third challenge—that posed by the PRC as a rising power—is no less difficult.

Last but not least, we remind readers that we are unable to avoid using binaries of identity categorization in this book. The use of such binaries as *waishengren* and *benshengren*, however, does not necessarily suggest that the authors are blind to the complexities—if not falsities—these identity categories create and of Taiwan's identity politics in general. First, in spite of such complexities, it is hardly practical to avoid using these terms in discussing the politics of ethnicity and nationalism in Taiwan. Second, most chapters in this volume are devoted to analyzing the relationship between the process of indigenization and ethnic identity politics in which several binaries of identity categorization prevail. However, an author's analysis of the politics of such identity categorizations does not necessarily suggest that he or she agrees with their popular use. The prevalence of these identity categories is part of Taiwan's social reality. An author's analysis of an "is" problem should not be confused with his or her practical position on this problem. The is–ought distinction should be made. Third, at a time when the deconstructionist critique of master narratives of identity has become popular, understandably, any specific category of collective identity is liable to be criticized as "false." Nevertheless, as Benedict Anderson notes, "all communities larger

than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined."[29] It follows that the main thrust of study on collective identities lies not so much in distinguishing their falsity/genuineness as in examining their social effects. However "false" the identity dichotomies we use in this book are, they have created significant social effects. One of the tasks we set for this book was to clarify the origins of these identity dichotomies and to analyze their social effects.

Notes

1. As trumpeted in the May 28, 2004 issue of *Taiwan Journal* (published by the Government Information Office): "On May 20, President Chen Shui-bian, whose election in 2000 marked a historic transfer of power after more than five decades of Kuomintang rule, was inaugurated for a second term. The fact that ROC citizens granted the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) four more years in office suggests not only an upsurge of a sense of Taiwanese identity on the island, but also strong grassroots support for the DPP's agenda of social reform."
2. Xiao Aqin (A-chin Hsiau), "Kangri jiti jiyi de minzuhua: Taiwan yijiu qiling niandai de zhanhou shidai yu Riju shiqi Taiwan xinwenxue 抗日集體記憶的民族化:臺灣一九七0年代的戰後世代與日據時期臺灣新文學" (Nationalizing Collective Memory in 1970s Taiwan: The Postwar Generation and Its "Rediscovery" of Taiwanese Colonial Literature as Anti-Japanese Resistance), *Taiwanshi yanjiu*, 9.1 (2002): 181–239.
3. Xiao Aqin (A-chin Hsiau), "Rentong, xushi, yu xingdong: Taiwan yijiu qiling niandai dangwai de lishi jiangou 認同，敘事，與行動：臺灣一九七0年代黨外的歷史建構" (Identity, Narrative, and Action: The Anti-GMD Dissident Construction of History in 1970s Taiwan), *Taiwan shehuixue*, 5 (2003): 195–250.
4. For example, see Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World*, London: Collins, 1990; Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State*, New York: Free Press, 1995; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1995; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Brookfield, VT: Elgar, 1992, especially chapter 3.
5. A-chin Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, London: Routledge, 2000, 178.
6. Robin Cohen and Paul Kennedy, *Global Sociology*, New York: Palgrave, 2000, 24.
7. Yu Sen-lun, " 'Naruwan! Welcome to Taiwan!,' " *Taipei Times*, February 15, 2004, page 17, accessed at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2004/02/15/2003098895.
8. Joy Su, "Tourism officials woo Japanese," *Taipei Times*, February 1, 2004, page 2, accessed at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/02/01/2003097006.

9. Yu Sen-lun, " 'Naruwan! Welcome to Taiwan!' "
10. John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999, 6, 11.
11. Horng-luen Wang, "Rethinking the Global and the National: Reflections on National Imaginations in Taiwan," *Theory, Culture & Society*, 17.4 (2000): 94, 110.
12. Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, London: Routledge, 1998, 12.
13. Ibid., 12.
14. J. Jorge Klor de Alva, "The Post-colonization of the (Latin) American Experience: A Reconsideration of 'Colonialism,' 'Postcolonialism' and 'Mestizaje,' " in Gyan Prakash (ed.), *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 245.
15. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in his *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 1973, 269, 270, 278.
16. Ibid., 258.
17. Ibid., 261.
18. For example, see the harsh criticism of Taiwan's "cultural independence" (文化台獨) made by Tang Shubei 唐樹備, the former vice president of China's Association for Cross-Strait Relations 海峽兩岸關係協會 and the then director of the Cross-Strait Relations Research Center 海峽兩岸關係研究中心 (*People's Daily*, June 27, 2001, accessed at http://english.people.com.cn/english/200106/27/ eng20010627_73599.html).
19. Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970, 39–40.
20. Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, 101.
21. Edward Friedman, *National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 141.
22. Li Xiaodong 李曉東, "Juanshou yu 卷首語" (Preface), in Zhongguo shehui kexue yanjiuhui 中國社會科學研究會 (ed.), *Zhongguo yu Riben de tazhe renshi—Zhong-Ri xuezhe de gongtong tantao* 中國與日本的他者認識—中日學者的共同探討 (Chinese and Japanese Knowledge of Others—A Common Investigation by Chinese and Japanese Scholars), Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004, 1.
23. For a historical description of the ambivalent feelings of Taiwan's political leaders toward Japan, see Xu Zongmao 徐宗懋, *Riben qingjie—Cong Jiang Jieshi dao Li Denghui* 日本情結——從蔣介石到李登輝 (Japan Complex—from Jiang Jieshi to Li Denghui), Taipei: Tianxia wenhua, 1997.
24. For instance, see Chen Kongli 陳孔立, "Riju shiqi Taiwan lishi de jige wenti 日據時期台灣歷史的幾個問題" (Some Questions regarding the History of the Period of Japanese Occupation of Taiwan), in Caituan faren xiachao jijinhui 財團法人夏潮基金會 (ed.), *Renshi Taiwan lishi* (1895–1945) *xueshu taolunhui* 認識台灣歷史 (1895–1945) 學術討論會 (Symposium on the Understanding of Taiwan History [1895–1945]), 1998, A1–2, 3, 13; Cai Jiarui 才家瑞, "Riju shiqi (1895–1945) Taiwan tongbao de minzu yishi yu guojia rentong 日據時期 (1895–1945) 台灣同胞的民族意識與國家認同"

(The National Consciousness and Identity of Taiwanese Compatriots During the Period of Japanese Occupation), in Caituan faren xiachao jijinhui, *Renshi Taiwan lishi*, A2–11, 12, 13; Wang Liren 王立人 and Yan Shimei 顏士梅, " 'Riben qingjie': Wenhua suyuan yu touxi '日本情結' : 文化溯源與透析" (The "Japan Complex": Its Cultural Origins and an Analysis), in Caituan faren xiachao jijinhui, *Renshi Taiwan lishi*, A3–7, 8, 9.

25. Chen Fenglin 陳奉林, "Zhanhou Riben dui Tai zhengce gaishu (1952–1997) 戰後日本對台政策概述 (1952–1997 年)" (An Outline of Japanese Postwar Policy on Taiwan, 1952–1997), in Song Chengyou 宋成有 and Tang Chongnan 湯重南 (eds.), *Dongya quyu yishi yu heping fazhan* 東亞區域意識與和平發展 (Regional Consciousness and Peaceful Development in East Asia), Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 2001, 471, 473.
26. For example, see Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century*, Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 1998, especially chapter 5; Ali Mirsepassi, *Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000, especially chapter 4; Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals*, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2001, especially chapters 1, 5, and 6.
27. Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*, 9.
28. Ibid., 9.
29. Benedict Anderson, *The Imagined Community: The Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1983, 6.

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